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Edgeworth cyclesPrice leadership is a concept that lacks precision. We propose a deliberately narrow, falsiﬁable, deﬁnition
then develop it, illustrate its feasibility and test it using the two leading British supermarket chains. We
ﬁnd both ﬁrms engaging in leading prices upward over a range of products, with the larger being initially
more dominant but the smaller increasing leadership activity to take overall leadership over time. However,
more price leadership events are price reductions than price increases, consistently led by the smaller ﬁrm.
Nevertheless, the increases are of larger monetary amounts than the falls, so average basket price increases
over time.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license. 1. Introduction
The concept of price leadership lacks precision in existing litera-
ture. We aim to improve precision in what is meant by leadership,
and then illustrate this using price data on the two leading British
supermarkets. In our view, precision requires a careful and falsiﬁable
deﬁnition of the concept. Unfortunately, this is more difﬁcult than it
might seem. To illustrate, the OECD deﬁnition “Price leadership refers
to a situation where prices and price changes established by a domi-
nant ﬁrm, or a ﬁrm are accepted by others as the leader, and which
other ﬁrms in the industry adopt and follow”1 seems rather circular.SRC (Grant RES-062-23-1962)
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285.
.V. Open access under CC BY license. Similarly, characterising three types of price leadership, Dominant
ﬁrm, Collusive and Barometric, Scherer and Ross (1990, p.249) sug-
gest as distinguishing characteristics for the last of these “occasional
changes in the identity of the price leader … the absence of leader
power to coerce others into accepting its price; a tendency for the
leader formally to validate price reductions that other sellers have
already initiated…”. Since this well-established text is a common ref-
erence source for subsequent work, the situation remains confused.
Some analyses have argued from effect to attribution of leadership,
for example the limited analysis in Competition Commission (hereaf-
ter CC, 2000, ch. 7), rather than from an exogenous starting point to
investigation of leadership. Finally, we need to accommodate multi-
product ﬁrms.
We propose a new falsiﬁable deﬁnition of what constitutes price
leadership (and, by implication, what does not):
Price leadership occurs when one ﬁrm makes a change in a price
(or set of prices) that is followed within a predetermined short
period by the other (more generally, another) ﬁrm making a price
change of exactly the same monetary amount in the same direc-
tion on the same product(s), and doing so signiﬁcantly more often
than would be expected by chance.
In our deﬁnition, the italicised elements are to be particularised to
the speciﬁc circumstance or industry. Thus what we propose is a
potentially general deﬁnition, illustrated using a speciﬁc case study
of considerable interest.
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those followed with a long lag, price changes of similar monetary
amounts, or on a similar but not the same product. It is clearly falsiﬁ-
able since it may not occur. More positively, the deﬁnition identiﬁes
candidate cases of which ﬁrm is engaging in leadership on which
products when. Leadership is deliberately deﬁned narrowly, choosing
a speciﬁc interval to reduce the possibility that chance movements
are included, but allowing time for reaction, so the bias if any is
towards not observing it when it occurs. Moreover, by maintaining
a tight deﬁnition of candidate cases, robust testing against the
alternative of chance observation can be performed, thereby sifting
from candidate cases those that occur signiﬁcantly more often than
expected by chance. These become our clear cases of leadership.
As an empirical case study, we examine leadership behaviour in
the British supermarket industry, a signiﬁcant market and one
which has the useful institutional feature of national pricing. Here,
for reasons spelt out below in describing the industry, there are two
clear leadership candidates, Tesco and Asda. We examine their pric-
ing behaviour using our new leadership concept. Signiﬁcant features
of the industry lead us to particularise the proposed deﬁnition. Specif-
ically, we deﬁne what we mean by price and by product and starting
point, choose the short period of response by the follower, develop
and employ a test of whether leadership happens more often than
may be expected, and deﬁne sub-types of leadership.
Previewing results, we ﬁnd considerable evidence that leadership
exists. Most strikingly, we ﬁnd that whilst Tesco appears commonly to
lead prices upward in the ﬁrst four years of our sample, there is a
clear switch whereby over the last three years Asda comes to dominate
leads upward. However, we observe signiﬁcantly more leadership in
price reductions than in price rises. Asda is more involved in reductions
than Tesco, but both are extremely active in leading reductions, partic-
ularly in our later years. These results bring out certain features that
theoreticalmodels have suggested,most obviously the switch of leader-
ship between ﬁrms and the smaller ﬁrm beingmore involved in leading
falls.
Our plan is as follows. We outline the analytical literature in
Section 2. We then describe the industry (Section 3), the nature of
our sample data (Section 4) and general features of pricing behaviour
in the industry (Section 5). Section 6 particularlises the deﬁnition
above to the British supermarket industry. Our characterisation
of leadership and our analysis of overall leadership, including
distinguishing it from random behaviour, is carried out in Section 7,
the core of the paper. We move on in Section 8 to looking at more
disaggregated levels of price leadership. Finally, Section 9 offers a
brief conclusion relating the ﬁndings to the theory. We do not draw
normative conclusions.
2. The analytical literature on price leadership
Amongst the main contributions to the modern literature on price
leadership are Rotemberg and Saloner (1990), Deneckere and
Kovenock (1992), Deneckere et al. (1992), Pastine and Pastine
(2004), also Maskin and Tirole (1988), Eckert (2003) and Noel
(2008). These papers' main focus is on all (both) ﬁrms in the market
being strategic players, rather than one main actor together with a
raft of passive ﬁrms, which was common in the more traditional
literature.
Rotemberg and Saloner have a collusive story underlying their
model; price leadership facilitates tacit collusion by one ﬁrm signalling
to others that prices should rise. One ﬁrm raises its price and the other
decides non-cooperatively whether to follow — this involves the usual
tradeoff between the immediate beneﬁts of deviating from this strategy
against the longer-term beneﬁts of holding to it. They show existence
but go beyond this to characterise the equilibrium. The leader earns
higher proﬁt but leadership may emerge endogenously with the less
informed ﬁrm wishing to follow the better informed. Interestingly,leadership may be characterised by extensive periods of static prices
after a leadership move upwards, because the follower beneﬁts from
rigid prices.
Again, endogenous leadership is an outcome of the Deneckere
papers, although the underlying models differ. The Deneckere and
Kovenock paper criticises the dominant ﬁrm pricing model, which
comes from an earlier less rigorous tradition, under which a large
ﬁrm with signiﬁcant market share is assumed to take on the leader-
ship role, the others being passive. In their duopoly game, when
ﬁrms' capacities are in the range where the simultaneous game
leads to mixed strategy solutions, a game of timing emerges with
the high capacity player becoming the price leader. Deneckere et al.
has ﬁrms who cannot discriminate between loyal consumers and
others. The ﬁrm with the smaller loyal segment strictly prefers to be
a price follower. Thus here consumer behaviour signiﬁcantly inﬂu-
ences the identity of the price leader, the ﬁrm with the larger loyal
consumer base taking on the leadership role. Pastine and Pastine
add to this analysis by noting two things. First, there should arguably
be a cost of delay, however small, in making a later price announce-
ment. Second, they allow ﬁrms to make price announcements at
any time. This allows ﬁrms to mix over the timing of their pricing
moves. Hence, occasional changes in the identity of the price leader
will occur. Amir and Stepanova have a model where one ﬁrm enjoys
lower costs than the other. Despite endogenous timing, in equilibri-
um a ﬁrm with sufﬁciently lower costs adopts the leadership role;
that is it has a ﬁrst-mover advantage.
In sum, our reading of this branch of the literature leads to several
key conclusions. First, the identity of the leader is not assured – it may
not be the largest ﬁrm, which is the traditional assumption. Second,
following from this, the leader may differ over time or products – if
for example loyalties shift, or multiproduct ﬁrms have strengths
that vary across the product range. However, changes in the price
leader's identity require some changes over time, or alternatively
mixing over timing of moves. Third, leadership need not have collu-
sion as its driving force. Nevertheless, it can result in higher prices
than simultaneous pricing (Deneckere and Kovenock). Of the papers
discussed above, only Rotemberg and Saloner focus on collusion as
the driver. We are unable to test this prediction directly, but
Chevalier et al. (2003) ﬁnd little support for it.
The models covered so far focus attention on endogenous price
leadership. A second strand of literature, relating to so-called Edge-
worth cycles, has prices rising due to leadership, then falling by small-
er amounts as ﬁrms in turn undercut rivals in order to dominate the
market, before reaching a low point from which they are again raised.
The basic theoretical framework is set out in Maskin and Tirole
(1988) and the model has been extended by Eckert (2003) and by
Noel (2008). Maskin and Tirole's model permits two possible equilib-
ria. Under a non-trivial and possibly broad range of circumstances,
ﬁrms engage in pricing behaviour of a “saw-tooth” style in one of
their Markov-perfect equilibria, with substantial leader-driven price
rises. Eckert shows that price cycle equilibria are more likely when
relative ﬁrm sizes differ. One clear prediction: the smaller ﬁrm is
the one more likely to undercut. For reasonable parameters, Noel
shows using computational techniques that the saw-tooth pattern is
robust to ﬂuctuating marginal costs, mild product differentiation
and asymmetry between ﬁrms. Price rises may be initiated due to
cost hikes.
This Edgeworth cycle pattern has been observed in many gasoline
retailing markets in the US, Canada, several European countries and
Australia (Wang, 2009). Yet by no means all such markets exhibit
these patterns (see e.g. Lewis, 2011; Noel, 2007, 2009; Lewis and
Noel, 2011; Zimmerman et al., 2011). Indeed, the market where the
saw-tooth Edgeworth cycle pattern has been studied has almost
always been gasoline retailing.
In our context, there are clearly many potential differences
between gasoline markets and supermarkets/grocery markets. Most
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multiproduct in an extreme form. In gasoline markets, the product set
examined essentially boils down to one. Additionally, it is common to
investigate behaviour of a single market price, essentially excluding
the possibility of longer-lived differences between the supplying
ﬁrms' prices. Also, the periodicity is much shorter in gasoline than
in grocery, given the visibility of prices. Finally, in gasoline a major
empirical advantage is the easy availability of wholesale prices,
whereas in grocery markets the wholesale contracts are complex,
privately negotiated and commonly non-linear. In consequence, it is
unclear whether the equilibria including the Edgeworth cycle mecha-
nisms set out by Maskin and Tirole will be maintained in industries
like groceries that are much further from the theoretical framework
than is retail gasoline. Nevertheless we look for evidence of the
phenomenon.
In sum, we draw predictions both from the endogenous price
leadership models and from the Edgeworth cycle literature when
we examine leadership in our data.
Edgeworth cycle behaviour should be distinguished from a related
phenomenon whereby price rises more quickly when costs rise, than
price falls when costs fall by an equivalent amount — asymmetric
pricing behaviour. Peltzman (2000) ﬁnds this to be a widespread
phenomenon in markets he studies (although not, incidentally, in
his supermarket sample). This is distinct because (a) it does not
necessarily involve a leader, but (b) it does require a cost change,
which the Maskin–Tirole framework does not (Lewis and Noel, 2011).3. The British supermarket industry
Grocery retailing is the largest retail sector in the UK and an
important market. Verdict Research (2008), a market research orga-
nization, estimates that in 2007, food and grocery retailing accounted
for around 42%, and rising, of total UK retail spending. The sector is
dominated by four players. Tesco is by far the biggest of these, with
Kantar putting its share at around 30% in 2011. Therefore, Tesco
alone accounts for over 1/8 of British retail consumer spending, on
these ﬁgures. In recent years Tesco, and to a lesser extent Asda, now
the second largest ﬁrm, have grown signiﬁcantly. In fact, Kantar ﬁg-
ures suggest that until 1995, Sainsbury's (generally perceived as
somewhat higher quality and less price competitive) was the largest
ﬁrm, but ﬁrst Tesco then, during 2003, Asda overtook it and Asda
has maintained second position.2 Both these ﬁrms operate large
stores extensively; according to CC (2008), substantially fewer than
ten of Asda's stores are less than 1400 m2 in size.3 Tesco operates
more of a variety of store sizes. Its nearly 1,400 stores in 2008
comprised four main groups, the two largest accounting for 564
stores (and undoubtedly a major share of their sales). Tesco and
Asda together account for well over 40% of grocery sales.4
A key industry feature (CC, 2003) is that these ﬁrms practise
national pricing. In other words, whether shopping in Cornwall or
the Scottish Highlands, consumers face the same prices in their larger
stores. Asda operates a uniform national pricing policy (with very
minor differences) across all its British stores. Throughout our sample
period, Tesco operates a uniform national pricing policy across its
large stores, and many of their (smaller) Metro stores also. These
uniform prices hold nationally — there are none of the intricate vari-
ations in prices that characterise US grocery retailing. Thus national
TV advertising, for example, will include (selective) price informa-
tion. This feature of the market is in itself curious,5 since costs such2 Both our sources agree on the latter point.
3 Very recently, Asda has purchased a smaller operator, Netto, which will have in-
creased its store numbers in the smaller category.
4 TNS (2009) puts it at almost 50%.
5 This is studied in Dobson and Waterson (2008),as wages and rents, incomes and competition will differ from location
to location. However, for present purposes, we take it as a given.
Both Tesco and Asda are part of major international retailing
groups, in Tesco's case UK based. Tesco is one of the world's top
four retailers; Asda is the British subsidiary of Walmart. Hence their
pricing strategies are backed by powerful groups. They are the obvi-
ous candidates for price leadership in the market, given their size
and growth. Tesco is a natural candidate since it is the dominant play-
er in terms of market share and it enjoys a cost advantage (CC, 2008).
Asda has been chosen for study because it has a reputation both as a
keen pricer in relation to Tesco and an aggressive player — it is the
chain most driven by price. More generally, there is close price rivalry
between Asda and Tesco, as seen below. Sainsbury's, now the number
three ﬁrm, has been notably less aggressive and more idiosyncratic in
its pricing practices, and has preferred a quality image. Morrisons is
very much the fourth player, absorbed with consolidating a difﬁcult
merger with Safeway in late 2003 and lacking an internet arm.
Various reports including ofﬁcial investigations (e.g. CC, 2000, 2008)
have described Tesco and Asda as leading market trends. Given
their pricing practices, we examine their interrelationship using
these national prices as our key statistics.
4. The data sample
We have available, week-by-week, the chain prices for 370 pre-
cisely deﬁned products over seven years from late 2003 to late 2010
for both key players in the British supermarket industry. Our sample
starts when Tesco started its “Tesco Price Check” website. This was
an independently collected large scale weekly comparison of precise-
ly deﬁned products across Tesco, Asda, Sainsbury's and Safeway/
Morrisons. We supplement this with data, from early 2008 onwards,
downloaded from a website called mysupermarket.co.uk (who
collected across Tesco, Asda and Sainsbury's) to create the seven
year sample; the two samples overlap for much of 2008. Thus we
have consistent data for Tesco, Asda (and Sainsbury's) over seven
years. We use the Tesco and Asda data in this analysis.
Our 370 products are those where we are able to form a good qual-
ity price series over the full period.6 Some are branded products
(e.g., Nescafe Gold Blend Coffee 200 g), others are essentially identical
chain brand products (e.g. Own label fresh single cream, 568 ml). Of
the 370 products, 331 were priced identically by Tesco and Asda,
either at the start or soon thereafter. These 331 products, as from the
7th week, constitute the sample in our analysis below.7,8 Of these,
202 or almost 2/3 of the products, were priced identically within the
ﬁnal month of the sample. Of course, the prices were not identical at
beginning and end, in fact mean item price at the start was a little
over £1.50, but by the end was £1.85 and had been up to £1.90.
What we do not have are unit cost data on the products. We inves-
tigate prices in the absence of costs. However, we contend: (a) that
price leadership is not necessarily directly or exclusively related to
moves following cost changes, and (b) that given the nature of the in-
dustry and its bargaining and billing practices, unit cost data could be
extremely misleading as to the true value of the transaction passing
between supplier and supermarket. These issues with unit costs
may be a problem beyond the British supermarket industry.
On point (a), this would exclude Edgeworth cycle type behaviour
from our analysis. Such cycles involve cost-driven signiﬁcant price
rises followed by more numerous but smaller largely non-cost related
moves down. On point (b), it is clear from the CC Groceries report6 The sample is clearly not random. However, appropriately weighted, it tracks the
ofﬁcial CPI well (see Chakraborty et al., 2011). The correlation between baskets
constructed from our supermarket prices to mimic the CPI index and the index itself
is uniformly very high, in excess of 0.93.
7 Here, including Sainsbury's would have required a change in methodology, given
its different pricing levels.
8 See Section 6 for a fuller justiﬁcation of the omission of earlier weeks.
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Fig. 1. Median duration of regular prices across our sample of 331 products.
10 This aligns with theMacroeconomic literature onmicro pricing behaviour (e.g. Kehoe
and Midrigan, 2010; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008, 2010).
11 Recall that national pricing implies comparisons can be, and are, publicised on na-
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nonlinear pricing: lump sum payments and promotional allowances
are common (see CC, 2008, Appendix 9.8). Many of these practices
are well known in the grocery industry and slotting allowances, for
example, have received signiﬁcant study (e.g. Marx and Shaffer,
2010); some such practices have featured in the supermarket sector
for some time (Chintagunta, 2002) and render the concept of a
wholesale price somewhat problematic (Srinivasan et al, 2004, note
that the widely-used Dominick's data suffers similar problems in
later years).
In addition and less widely reported, British supermarket pay-
ments to suppliers are substantially affected by retrospective partial
withholding of the agreed payment for a shipment, without a rational
basis. To quote from CC (2008) “For example, a requirement for a
price adjustment after goods have been ordered or after products
have been delivered is a typical practice that is a source of unexpected
costs to suppliers. Similarly, requirements for ﬁnancing or promo-
tions that were not agreed with the suppliers are also retrospective
adjustments that are a source of uncertainty.” (CC, 2008, para.
9.45); “For example, we saw that at least one grocery retailer imposes
liability on some of its suppliers for losses suffered as a result of
shrinkage (i.e. losses that arise where stock is recorded on a
company's books but is not on hand, due to theft, the goods being
lost or accounting error). In our view, the party best placed to control
risks arising through shrinkage is the retailer” (CC, 2008, para. 9.48).
So signiﬁcant are these problems that a survey conducted by a ﬁrm
of accountants reports (para. 9.61) “Only 50 per cent of suppliers
felt highly conﬁdent, at the time of delivery, that the sale price
would not be reduced by retrospective contributions sought.” In
these circumstances, an ex-ante unit cost ﬁgure is arguably extremely
misleading.
5. Characterising pricing in the supermarket industry
Before moving to examining leadership speciﬁcally, we discuss
pricing behaviour in the industry beyond the feature of uniform
national pricing, to explain further why it is a good case study for
examining price leadership and why we consider cost changes as a
potentially relatively unimportant driver of price changes.9
First, prices in the industry are very ﬂexible, even when short term
offers are removed from the data; much more ﬂexible than could pos-
sibly be explainable through changes in costs. Fig. 1 shows median
duration of price moves to a new level across our products and time
period. As can be seen, for most products at either of our two chains,
the median duration is only a little over a month. The second point to
emphasise is the variety of experience across products in terms of
pricing behaviour, implicit in Fig. 1. Whilst in both chains milk (prod-
ucts) change prices infrequently, perhaps as little as once per year,
other products change price frequently; amongst these alcoholic
drinks are a category that stands out.
One common feature of supermarket pricing is the temporary
offer price, where price is reduced for a short period, later returning
to the same level. We have constructed separate series of temporary
offers and of regular prices for later analysis. To get a clean split, we
divide price movements into those that are “V shaped” Temporary
Price Reductions (TPRs) which lead to a return to the same price,
and all other price movements. The appropriate vehicle for doing
this is Nakamura and Steinsson's (2008) Regular price under the “B”
version of their algorithm, described in Nakamura and Steinsson
(2010), yielding, for shorthand, NSB Regular prices. We adopt the
exact deﬁnition Nakamura (2008) uses for weekly data (but examine
it for robustness). This requires a TPR reversion to the exact same
price as before the fall within the next six weeks. In constructing9 Much more detail on general pricing behaviour in the industry is provided in
Chakraborty et al. (2011).Fig. 1, we removed these temporary price offers from more perma-
nent moves, so the frequencies represent price changes to a new
level.
We should also note an element of nonlinear pricing in temporary
offers made by these and other chains (three for the price of two offers,
etc.); we do not observe these. However it is clear that when we exam-
ine regular priceswe look only at single itemprices, not package deals.10
Thus investigating leadership in NSB regular prices involves a clear ap-
proach focussing on single unit purchases, whereas perhaps in looking
at leadership in temporary prices theremay also be leadership in special
offers (e.g. matching of three-for-the-price-of-two) that is unobserved.
An associated feature of pricing in the industry, itself the subject of
study in Chakraborty et al. (2011), is that at various times, markedly
so in 2008, there is a welter of price cuts of very small monetary
value even abstracting from TPRs. Indeed, penny price cuts, even on
products costing several pounds, are very common. This pattern is
unlikely to be related to changes in costs. In fact, our observations
are consistent with the type of publicity these ﬁrms have engaged
in at various stages, where prices of particular items relative to
other chains, or a count of numbers of price falls, are highlighted.11
Finally, in Fig. 2 below we show weighted basket prices calculated
from our data sample of 370 products, using weights equivalent to
those used in the CPI. This illustrates that Sainsbury's takes a somewhat
different path from Asda or Tesco, with somewhat higher pricing.6. Particularising the deﬁnition of price leadership to the British
supermarket case
To examine leadership behaviour in the British supermarket
industry, we must make certain speciﬁc choices. The ﬁrst is the deﬁ-
nition of price. As set out in Section 5 above, substantial temporary
price reductions are a common marketing tool in supermarket retail-
ing. Scanner based studies ﬁnd signiﬁcant purchases are made at
times when especially low prices are set (Chevalier et al., 2003;
Grifﬁth et al., 2009). However we are concerned here more with
price leadership than consumer purchases. For these purposes, we
analysed price leadership separately in respect of TPRs and all other
price movements. It transpires that those TPRs which are led form a
relatively small proportion of all temporary price falls, so we devotetional television. Perhaps the most successful such campaign, according to industry in-
siders, is the Asda “arrows” advertisement series shown in 2008, which cheekily made
use of the “Dad's Army” comedy show theme tune in comparing itself with Tesco.
0.95
1
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1.1
1.15
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1.25
Tesco Sainsbury's ASDA
Fig. 2. Price indices calculated using CPI product weights from our data sample.
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movements.
The second choice is the predetermined short period within which
the follower responds. Most grocery shopping in large British supermar-
kets is doneweekly or fortnightly (CC, 2008). Perusing the data, prices do
sometimes vary as often as weekly. Therefore we adopt “within the next
two weeks” as deﬁning the predetermined short period. Nevertheless,
since this is potentially controversial, we engage in sensitivity testing
in the Appendix and report on it brieﬂy in Section 7.
What do we mean by “the same product”? For a branded product,
wemean the exact sameproduct, or UPC, i.e. same brand, samedescrip-
tion and packaging, same size. An example would be “Heinz baked
beans and pork sausages 8's 420 g”. But British supermarkets also sell
very extensive ranges of own brand products, which we do not want
to exclude, particularly since consumers commonly perceive them as
very close substitutes in the lower quality ranges. An example would
be “Own label budget chopped tomatoes 400 g”.12 In Section 8 we
compare leadership in branded and own label products.
Fourth is how to determine whether leadership takes place
“signiﬁcantly more often than would be expected by chance”. Here
we must allow for the multiproduct nature of supermarket sales.
There is some meaning to the statement that “Chain X is the leader
in own label budget chopped tomatoes, 400 g” over a particular
period. But there is signiﬁcantly moremeaning to the summative state-
ment “Chain X is the leader in (NSB Regular) price rises in 2008”. Given
our tight deﬁnition of what potentially qualiﬁes as leadership we can
say that on average, if price movements are random, we would observe
just as many cases where chain X changes price by a particular amount,
to be followed up to two weeks later by chain Y, as the reverse case, or
cases where the two chains change prices simultaneously.13 Hence we
can test overall price leadership, and speciﬁc product cases, by standard
statisticalmethods, approximating the Binomial distribution (assuming
numbers are sufﬁciently large).
The ﬁfth choice is an appropriate starting point for analysing lead-
ership behaviour. Widespread comparative price data became easily
available to both players only with the innovation of the Tesco
“Price Check” website. Within the ﬁrst few weeks, a homogenisation
of prices across the chains took place. For the ﬁrst time, consumers12 The supermarkets sell up to three quality levels. The word “budget” in this descrip-
tion means the lowest level. Own label plum peeled tomatoes, 400 g, being a higher
quality product, command a premium. We always match like-with-like.
13 See Section 7 for fuller explanation of this argument.could easily make comparisons. We decide to start our investigation
from a point six weeks after the start of the website, and to select
those 331 products (the vast majority of our sample) initially priced
identically in Tesco and Asda. The particular timing, six weeks after,
is not critical, because in the early period there is relatively little
price movement, as we shall see.
Finally, price leadership may be either upward or downward, as
well as being driven by either player. To summarise then, we investi-
gate leadership in TPRs by each player, plus upward and downward
leadership in NSB Regular prices by each player, both summatively
and to a lesser extent, in speciﬁc subsets of the data. Our investigation
is positive, not normative, in spirit.
7. Leadership incidence, signiﬁcance and impact at the
aggregate level
We now turn to an empirical examination of leadership as
between Tesco and Asda, using the deﬁnition we proposed in the
Introduction. Following the separation discussed in Sections 5 and 6
above, we ﬁrst brieﬂy examine temporary price reductions and lead-
ership. Because this turns out to be a relatively limited phenomenon,
we spend signiﬁcantly more time in examining leadership in NSB
regular prices, as deﬁned earlier.
7.1. Temporary price reductions and leadership
In examining leadership of temporary price reductions (TPRs), we
ask whether a TPR by one of the players is followed, one or two weeks
later, by a move to the same extent by the other player; for example if
one ﬁrm reduces product X by y pence, for a temporary period, does
the other reduce the same product to the same extent (not necessar-
ily for the same length of time)? Of course, at the time the reduction is
made, it is often but not always obvious that this is temporary.
Unsurprisingly, TPRs where the price is reduced for up to six
weeks, later to return to the previous level, are a common feature in
our data. Both ﬁrms employ them, although Tesco does to a greater
extent than Asda. Overall incidence across the years is given in the
upper panel of Table 1. Their use peaks in 2008, and they are relative-
ly uncommon in the early years of our sample. A comparison between
TPR events and TPR weeks (not listed in the table) shows that the
average length of a TPR is in the 3–4 week range in the early years,
shortening to 2–3 weeks on average in 2008 and after. There is no
real difference between the ﬁrms on this.
Table 2
Summary of ﬁndings regarding regular price leadership.
Occasions on which ﬁrm led Tesco Asda
On price rise 347 256
Average rise 15.2p 14.2p
Products illustrating leadership 58% 53%
Maximum leads/week 12 7
On price fall 562 1328
Average fall 5.3p 3.5p
Products illustrating leadership 62% 87%
Maximum leads/week 21 39
Note: These results represent ﬁndings over 331 products for 369 weeks using “NSB
regular” prices.
Table 1
The incidence of temporary price reductions (TPRs), and TPR leadership cases by year.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Sum
Total TPR events 87 157 310 555 883 694 593 3279
Asda TPR 10 39 99 138 302 280 194 1062
Tesco TPR 77 118 211 417 581 414 399 2217
Total TPR leads 0 2 9 14 35 37 11 108
Asda TPR leads 0 2 7 11 29 33 8 90
Tesco TPR leads 0 0 2 3 6 4 3 18
Simult. TPR 0 0 3 3 4 10 0 20
Note: Based on 331 products.
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proportion of TPRs ﬁt our deﬁnition of leadership. In fact on average
only 3.3% of the TPRs observed can be described as leadership TPRs.
Such cases are more commonly initiated by Asda and peak at 33 in-
stances in 2009, but at peak this is less than 12% of its TPRs. One
point of comparison is the number of simultaneous TPRs, appended
at the foot of the table.
If TPRs were truly random, then on average a TPR led within the
next two weeks by one of the ﬁrms would be equally as likely to
occur as a simultaneous TPR.14 Because numbers of simultaneous
moves, and of Tesco leads, are very small, testing the null of equal
likelihood against the alternative is difﬁcult. However, a chi-squared
test of simultaneous TPR being equally likely as Asda TPR leadership
over the period 2007 to 2009 clearly rejects the null, whereas by in-
spection Tesco clearly leads no more often than would be seen by
chance. The implication is that Asda does on occasion lead TPRs, but
Tesco does not.
This work is based on a temporary reduction of up to six weeks,
which has the beneﬁt of an academic pedigree (Nakamura and
Steinsson, 2008) and has the merit of inclusiveness. However, there
remains the possibility that the period is too long. Therefore, we
also examined results using an alternative deﬁnition of four weeks
TPR. This has the merit that it ﬁts in with the mirror deﬁnition of pric-
ing comparisons with previous prices in BIS (2010). The results (in
the online appendix) are very similar, except that the proportion of
TPRs which qualify as leadership TPRs is smaller than for the six
week sample.
In conclusion under either deﬁnition, the number of leadership
events within TPRs in total is small; leadership of TPRs exists only to
a very limited extent. In consequence, we do not analyse TPRs further.
Instead we turn to leadership instances that move the price to a new
level, whether up or down.7.2. Regular price leadership, aggregate inﬂuence and signiﬁcance
We now investigate leadership in NSB regular prices as between
Tesco and Asda. We identify two broad types. One is upward price
leadership — a regular price movement upwards by one player
associated with an increase of exactly the same amount one or two
weeks later by the other player. Downward price leadership is
deﬁned completely analogously. Logically, there are four forms of
price leadership here — it could come from Tesco or Asda, and it
could be upward or downward. Within the sample, there are many
examples of each over the period, as Table 2 shows.
Table 2 summarises our broad ﬁndings. Even given our tight
deﬁnition, we see several hundred episodes that qualify as price
leadership (subject to signiﬁcance) over our large and quite lengthy
sample. Thus price leadership appears extremely common; it resides14 A TPR can be led by either ﬁrm with 50% probability, if random. But it can be either
in the subsequent week or two weeks' time. Hence the probability that a random event
is a lead within the next two weeks by (say) Asda equals the probability of observing a
simultaneous TPR. This methodology is spelt out at greater length in the next sub-
section.in both players and covers a majority of the goods at some stage or
another over our seven year period. In this sense, neither player is
“the” price leader. Yet, it is difﬁcult to think how the deﬁnition of
leadership could be made narrower than the one we have employed,
to reduce the incidence of leadership episodes. Our ﬁndings here are
strongly conﬁrmatory of the recent literature's broad emphasis that
leadership is endogenous, not residing in one player, nor necessarily
associated with the largest player.
Tesco is more often the price leader over price rises. In an echo of
Walmart's “rollback” programmes, Asda dominates leadership in
price falls, although these are on average smaller than the rises. In
fact, one of the most substantial ﬁndings is that leadership over
price falls greatly dominates leadership over price rises. Clearly, it is
not necessarily the case that price leadership is creating higher prices
than otherwise would be observed. This ﬁnding relates to the litera-
ture in the following sense. Although the traditional literature
emphasised implicit collusion as a motive for leadership, the domi-
nance of downward price movements in leadership episodes strongly
argues against this conclusion. In that sense, our evidence is more in
line with the less obviously motive-driven analyses of Deneckere
and others (Amir and Stepanova, 2006; Deneckere and Kovenock,
1992; Deneckere et al, 1992), rather than the Rotemberg and
Saloner (1990) collusion story. The ﬁnding that Asda dominates in
leadership on price falls is consistent with predictions from Eckert's
(2003) modelling of Edgeworth cycles where the smaller ﬁrm
initiates.
The overall picture conceals some important temporal variation,
which is illustrated in the upper panel of Table 3. Price leadership ap-
pears to become more signiﬁcant over the seven year period, mea-
sured either in absolute terms or relative to the total number of
price changes. It peaks in extent in 2009, with nearly a quarter of all
the regular price changes made within the year being leadership
moves (thereby covering almost 50% of regular price movements).
Moreover, over our time period, Asda comes to dominate leadership
on our deﬁnition, not only on price falls but also price rises, although
it remains the smaller ﬁrm. This outcome is consistent with the
models (e.g. Deneckere and Kovenock, 1992) where leadership is
endogenous rather than residing in the largest ﬁrm, as is the ﬁnding
that occasional changes to the leader occur. There is scant evidence
(regarding Rotemberg and Saloner, 1990) of stable prices following
an upward price lead.
Having painted the broad picture in Table 2 and the upper panel of
Table 3, we investigate the important question of whether what we
have styled leadership is different in a temporal, directional or fascia
sense from random behaviour. We ﬁrst examine this formally using a
set of chi-squared tests, shown in the lower panel of Table 3, with the
null hypotheses (i) that behaviour is random across years in terms of
upwards versus downwards movements, (ii) that upwards and
downwards movements are a random proportion of total price
changes, (iii) that the share of upwards (downwards) movements
by Tesco versus Asda is randomly distributed across the years. In
each case, the calculated chi-squared value is substantially in excess
Table 3
Leadership in regular prices by year, ﬁrm and direction compared with total price changes.
Movements by year
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (part) Total
Up Tesco 35 60 84 75 50 13 28 345
Asda 4 15 19 10 99 69 40 256
Down Tesco 7 13 42 47 138 259 54 560
Asda 47 61 32 43 329 649 162 1323
Sum 93 149 177 175 616 990 284 2484
Total price changes 826 1142 1240 1776 4220 3994 2412 15,610
Proportion 0.113 0.130 0.143 0.099 0.146 0.248 0.118 0.159
Chi-sq tests
Chi sq (6, 0.01) = 16.8
H0: Random frequency of observations being rises rather than falls across the years, rejected, calculated chi-sq = 376.4
H0: Random frequency of total rises are due to leadership, rejected, calculated chi-sq = 54.9
H0: Random frequency of total falls are due to leadership, rejected, calculated chi-sq = 320.8
H0: Frequency of leadership rises random across Tesco and Asda, rejected, calculated chi-sq = 189.8.
H0: Frequency of leadership falls random across Tesco and Asda, rejected, calculated chi-sq = 63.1
Note: Excludes the closing weeks of 2003. 2010 ends in November. Based on 331 products.
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meaning we ﬁrmly reject each of these hypotheses. In all these
senses, what we have identiﬁed as price leadership behaviour is not
random.
We now turn to more formal tests of regular price leadership,
focusing ﬁrst on overall leadership across our sample of products.
Does leadership occur more often than may be expected by chance?
The underlying methodology we adopt is as follows. In any week,
many prices do not change. Let us restrict attention to those that do
change, and in particular, in examining leadership, to those that
change by the same amount, Δp, given our deﬁnition. There are six
relevant events in the space. Denote by Y(t) a change in a price of
Δp by chain Y (i.e. Asda, A or Tesco, T) in week t, starting observation
at week 0. The relevant events are: {A(0), T(0)}, {A(0), T(1)}, {A(0),
T(2)}, {T(0), A(0)}, {T(0), A(1)}, {T(0), A(2)}. Of these, the ﬁrst and
fourth events are simultaneous movements (by Δp), the second and
third are leadership events by Asda and the ﬁfth and sixth, leadership
events by Tesco — notice that with independent moves, the ﬁrst and
fourth events are two events with the same outcome and outcomes
are what we observe.
So suppose the events we have suggested are leadership actions
that in fact take place by chance. By assumption there is an equal
chance that Asda will change its price by Δp and that Tesco will
change its price by Δp (this need not mean an equal chance of chang-
ing the price by a different amount), also price changes are distribut-
ed randomly across the year (which they are; Seaton and Waterson,
2012). Then if the events are truly random, the probability that theTable 4
Signiﬁcance tests of leadership versus simultaneous chance moves, aggregate level.
2004 2005 2006
Asda leads up 7 18 22
Simultaneous up 17 32 34
Observed proportion 0.292 0.360 0.393
z statistic −1.980 −1.604
Tesco leads up 33 58 86
Simultaneous up 17 32 34
Observed proportion 0.660 0.644 0.717
z statistic 2.263 2.741 4.747
Asda leads down 49 62 35
Simult down 5 26 11
Observed proportion 0.907 0.705 0.761
z statistic 5.988 3.838 3.539
Tesco leads down 7 31 50
Simult down 5 26 11
Observed proportion 0.583 0.544 0.820
z statistic 0.662 4.993
Note: Statistically signiﬁcant results of the expected sign at 5% level are highlighted in boldoutcome looks like Asda leadership is equal to the probability that
the outcome looks like Tesco leadership and equal to the probability
that the outcome looks like a simultaneous move by Δp.
This framework forms the theoretical basis for our test. Under
these assumptions, we examine whether the proportion of outcomes
of Asda (alternatively, Tesco) leadership compared with simulta-
neous moves is signiﬁcantly greater than the null of 0.5. Given rea-
sonably large numbers of observations, this proportion is distributed
according to the Binomial under the null hypothesis, and we test
using the Normal approximation to the Binomial.
Table 4 sets out our results, aggregated at the level of thewhole sam-
ple, all Δp, and by year. Each segment gives the numbers of leadership
outcomes, the number of simultaneous outcomes, the observed propor-
tion and the calculated z-statistic based on that proportion. These give
very clear results regarding upward pricemovements. Tesco is the over-
all leader in upwards price movements in years 2004 to 2007 inclusive.
Then Asda takes over and is the leader upwards in 2008 to 2010.
This signiﬁcant result conﬁrms our earlier more casual ﬁndings, and
suggests that the leadership change may be linked to a change in
proportions of loyal consumers (Deneckere et al., 1992) engendered
by Asda's successful advertising campaign in 2008.
With downward price movements, the picture is a little more
complex. Asda clearly leads in downward movements across the
whole sample. However, Tesco also leads downwards in 2009 and
2010, and a little less certainly, 2008.
We next explore this and other results at various lower levels of
product aggregation, in order to reﬁne the ﬁndings. But ﬁrst we2007 2008 2009 2010
9 130 84 46
48 62 10 16
0.158 0.677 0.894 0.742
−5.166 4.907 7.633 3.810
85 52 17 28
48 62 10 16
0.639 0.456 0.630 0.636
3.208 −0.937 1.347 1.809
61 718 1055 239
37 344 125 14
0.622 0.676 0.894 0.945
2.424 11.476 27.073 14.146
55 368 412 83
37 344 125 14
0.598 0.517 0.767 0.856
1.877 0.899 12.385 7.006
.
Table 5
Leadership in branded products across year, ﬁrm and direction.
Year
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Branded products only
Up Asda leads up 7 12 16 7 85 58 33
Simultaneous move 15 14 18 23 35 6 14
Proportion 0.318 0.462 0.471 0.233 0.708 0.906 0.702
z statistic −1.71 −0.39 −0.34 −2.92 4.564 6.500 2.771
Tesco leads up 17 45 48 58 35 14 17
Simultaneous move 15 14 18 23 35 6 14
Proportion 0.531 0.763 0.727 0.716 0.500 0.700 0.548
z statistic 0.354 4.036 3.693 3.889 0.000 1.789 0.539
Branded products only
Down Asda leads down 28 41 26 43 699 1012 217
Simultaneous move 3 22 4 25 329 122 13
Proportion 0.903 0.651 0.867 0.632 0.680 0.892 0.943
z statistic 4.490 2.394 4.017 2.183 11.540 26.429 13.451
Tesco leads down 5 27 41 34 355 406 83
Simultaneous move 3 22 4 25 329 122 13
Proportion 0.625 0.551 0.911 0.576 0.519 0.769 0.865
z statistic 0.707 0.714 5.516 1.172 0.994 12.360 7.144
Branded products only
Penny drops Asda leads down 9 12 18 10 329 592 104
Simultaneous move 0 8 2 8 108 92 6
Proportion 0.753 0.865 0.945
z statistic 10.572 19.118 9.344
Tesco leads down 2 14 28 9 197 327 58
Simultaneous move 0 8 2 8 108 92 6
Proportion 0.646 0.780 0.906
z statistic 5.096 11.481 6.500
Note: Statistically signiﬁcant results of expected sign highlighted in bold.
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price change is followed within the next two weeks. Supermarkets
change their prices weekly on occasion and so may be able to respond
within a week. On the other hand, the full effects may take longer to
be revealed. If we deﬁne leadership more narrowly as occurring only
if the price change is followed next week, or more broadly as the price
change following within the next three weeks, are the conclusions of
Table 4 modiﬁed? The answer is they are not; both key aggregate
ﬁndings – that Tesco leads upward movements to start with but
then Asda takes over, and that Asda always leads downwards move-
ments – are robust to these small deﬁnitional changes.158. Disaggregate tests of leadership in regular prices
8.1. Branded versus own-label goods
One obvious comparison is between leadership in branded and own
label goods. Within our sample 96 products are own label and 235
branded. Comparing upwards leadership across these two categories
of goods, we see that both are led up roughly equi-proportionally by
bothAsda and Tesco. Amore signiﬁcant comparison is between upward
ledmoves on branded products by the two ﬁrms and simultaneous up-
ward moves, as set out in the upper panel of Table 5.16 It is apparent
from this that Asda takes over from Tesco in 2008 in leading branded
good prices upwards.15 Obviously, the probabilities of a random outcome change from those described
above because the event space changes, so the tests are slightly modiﬁed. Also, in
two additional years, when looking at next week moves, there are small sample prob-
lems with the test. Results are available in the online appendix.
16 Own Label may be obtained by subtracting Branded (Table 5) from Aggregate
(Table 4).What is much more common is downward leadership of branded
goods. This completely dominates over downward movements of own
label goods. The middle panel of Table 5 covers these tests. Asda clearly
leads branded goods down much more than expected by chance in
every year of the sample. With Tesco, the picture is rather more
mixed and sporadic. Only in 2006, 2009 and 2010 can we say Tesco
leads branded goods down more often than would be expected by
chance.
Very many of these downward movements are drops of a penny,
covered in the bottom panel of Table 5. Again, neither ﬁrm leads on
penny drops amongst own label products. Because simultaneous
penny drops (and in fact, penny drops more generally) are rare be-
fore 2008, we focus attention on the last three years. Both Asda and
Tesco lead branded good prices downward by a single penny very
signiﬁcantly more often than would be expected by reference to si-
multaneous penny drops (numerous though these are in the latter
three years of our sample). Clearly, this became a major marketing
tool, very possibly driven by the direct price comparisons the two
companies engaged in, with well-known brands an obvious point
of focus.
By the same token, whilst it remains clear that Asda leads price
drops larger than a penny on branded goods far more commonly
than would be expected by chance (wherever the numbers allow us
to test this), only in 2009 does Tesco lead such larger price falls
down more often than by chance.
These results nuance our broader ﬁndings slightly. Most signiﬁ-
cantly, price leadership appears far more prevalent on branded
items than unbranded. Such leadership in upward price moves re-
mains with Tesco in the earlier years but switches to Asda in 2008.
Asda remains the clear leader in downward price movements on
branded products. Very many of these are price leads down by a
single penny in the years 2008 to 2010.
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Another interesting question is whether speciﬁc types of products
(e.g. detergents, bread) are subject to price leadership. Plausibly, con-
sumers notice and respond to the prices of some goods far more than
others, implying we may see patterns across broad product types in
leadership. Here of course we are constrained by product numbers in
particular categories, as deﬁned by COICOP (see Appendix Table A1).
We have four categories with good numbers of products (Bread and
Cereals; Milk cheese and eggs; sugar, jam, chocolate and confectionery;
speciﬁed other food products) and two with reasonable numbers
(processed vegetables; non-durable household items). Leadership
activity certainly varies amongst them. Again, we use simultaneous
price movements as a point of comparison. The table detailing the
results, which is fairly lengthy, is relegated to the online appendix.
The most numerous category, Bread and Cereals, is also one of the
most active. Both companies lead price movements on products.
Tesco leads prices both up and down across all years and Asda leads
prices down and, in later years, up. This provides a considerable
contrast with the Milk, Cheese and Eggs category, in which there is
no evidence of upward price leadership and little evidence of down-
ward leadership within our sample. The Sugar, Jam, Confectionery
category is one of the fewwhere Tesco is more active in leading prices
down than is Asda, which is rather more likely to lead them upwards.
There is a lot of downwards leadership in Processed Vegetables, but
only relatively little upward leadership from Tesco early on. Asda is
more active in leading both up and down in the Detergents etc.
category. In sum, there is quite a variety of experience looking across
product types, rather than homogeneity of behaviour.17
In a little more depth, there are a few striking things emerging
from examining behaviour across product type in relationship to17 This diversity of experience across product types does not appear to be determined
primarily by the proportion of branded products within subgroups. Own label products
are proportionately most common in the three subcategories Bread and Cereals, Milk
Cheese and Eggs, and Sugar, Confectionery, Jam, which show a variety of experience.upwards price leadership.18 First, we observe only Tesco leading
upward in the areas of tea and coffee products and spirits, whilst
we observe only Asda leading up on beers. In the soaps and deter-
gents category, we do not see any product example in which both
ﬁrms lead up at one time or another, although there are particular
items for which one ﬁrm or another leads. But the overall impression
is of relatively limited patterns of specialisation amongst the wide
range of product prices being led.8.3. Impact of price leadership
Examining upward price leadership, a legitimate question given
our narrow deﬁnition is whether those products exhibiting most
upward price leadership episodes also increase most in price; there
being several other means whereby prices can rise (e.g., simultaneous
price rises). We examined the percentage price changes over time
across all 331 products we use for this exercise and correlated these
with the number of upward leadership episodes by each player.
Tesco leadership episodes appear moderately important in explaining
price rises, consistent with Deneckere and Kovenock's (1992) model
with a simple correlation of 0.307 (signiﬁcant at conventional levels),
although this does not of course demonstrate causation. But for Asda,
the correlation is insigniﬁcant at 0.076.
Also, within the most numerous sub-categories of goods in our
sample,19 those that experience more Tesco price leadership episodes
also exhibit greater overall price increases. Within Bread and Cereals,
the mean price increase across the seven products with ﬁve or six in-
stances of such leadership was 68.6%, whereas for those 16 with zero
instances it was 34.4%, a ﬁgure which is signiﬁcantly lower, based on18 The comparisons in this and the following paragraph relate to raw numbers, not
signiﬁcance compared with simultaneous moves.
19 We look at sub-categories since within these products are likely to experience sim-
ilar cost pressures. For example, if wheat rises in price, this will affect all bread and ce-
real products similarly. Less populated sub-categories exhibit too few degrees of
freedom to examine this question with any degree of conﬁdence.
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upward price leadership is instrumental in raising prices.8.4. Four case studies
To provide a more detailed ﬂavour of our data, the following four
case studies illustrate the nature, complexity and possibly limited
nature of leadership. As we have seen, leadership is both upward
and downward and engaged in by both parties, but is not the only
means by which prices change. We have chosen to illustrate the pat-
terns over the key period of 2007 to 2009 where upward leadership
overall switched signiﬁcantly from Tesco to Asda and where, even
conﬁning analysis to regular price changes, downward leadership in-
creased to staggeringly high levels. Across the four cases, there are
two examples of products where the NSB regular price increased
markedly over the period and two where it decreased markedly.
They illustrate (but are not necessarily representative of) both brand-
ed and own label products and we have also made choices based on
ease of representation within a single graph at reasonable scale.
Looking ﬁrst at Fig. 3, illustrating products where price rises signif-
icantly, the Tunnocks' chocolate wafers case (the upper two curves)
looks like a classic Edgeworth cycle, a saw-tooth pattern of signiﬁcant
upward moves followed by downward smaller movements, albeit
played out over a year. Almost all leads in this case are followed.
The ﬁrst key upward move is clearly initiated by Tesco, whereas the
second in week 69 is simultaneous (although not from exactly the
same level) and the ﬁnal two upwardmoves start with Asda. Between
the second and third upward moves, there is a downwards path with
leadership alternating, whereas between third and fourth, Asda dom-
inates the downward moves. In the case of Batchelors' mushy peas
(the lower two curves of Fig. 3), not all moves are followed, with
both ﬁrms attempting an upward move at one point that is not recip-
rocated, and no obvious saw-tooth pattern. Nevertheless, there is a
key upward move led by Tesco in week 72 to 43p following which
it declines slightly to 41p, followed by a long slight decline, then asecond upward move in week 122 started by Tesco but pushed higher
by Asda to 48p, settling at 46p.
Fig. 4 shows two cases where prices end up a good deal lower than
they began. Colgate toothpaste (upper pair of curves) exhibits some
very noisy pricing behaviour, with a large number of unreciprocated
moves in both directions. However there is onemain largemove down-
wards by Asda in week 94, followed by Tesco, preceding a series of ap-
parent recantations to higher values but settling at around £1 to ﬁnish
much lower than at the start. The lower pair of curves show a staggering
early fall in the price of own brand pasta shells led by Asda but adopted
by both players. There is then a gradual rise over a long period from
around week 28, with the players taking turns to raise price ﬁrst,
settling for a while at 55p, but then rising to 78p, with some variance.
In 2009 there is a slow decline in price led by Asda to around 60p.
All four cases, incidentally, illustrate that pricing to end in 9 is not
a particularly common feature in our data. Price endings seem to
range widely across the products and time. These cases also illustrate
the closeness in these companies' prices on many occasions.9. Conclusion
We have proposed a very tight, falsiﬁable, deﬁnition of price lead-
ership then developed it, applied it to a particularly signiﬁcant market
and tested for signiﬁcance. Although the deﬁnition is tight, we observe
leadership to be a very common phenomenon, across the ﬁrms, prod-
ucts and time; it cannot be explained away as randomness in the data.
It also appears that leadership, as narrowly deﬁned, has become more
important in recent years as a phenomenon in the British supermarket
industry. But we cannot identify either ﬁrm as the consistent food
market leader.
Leadership differs over products as well as time, particularly re-
garding upward price leadership, where it clearly switches from
Tesco to Asda in the latter years of our sample. This is consistent
with the more recent theoretical literature's emphasis on endogenous
upward leadership and occasional changes in leadership engendered
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or the largest ﬁrm. There is no evidence that it is related to collusion,
although there is limited evidence of it inﬂuencing pricing levels. The
extensive downward price leadership is, in some instances, consistent
with cycles of the Edgeworth kind. Of course, the theory does not pre-
dict that Edgeworth cycles are the only outcome, merely a distinctive
one. Also, consistent with Eckert's (2003) theoretical predictions,
Asda, the smaller ﬁrm, dominates overall in downward price moves.
We are necessarily agnostic on whether the price moves relate closely
to underlying changes in costs.
Overall however, what we observe, including the relative focus on
branded goods, is also consistent with a casual theory in which super-
markets are very concerned about their position on price comparisons0
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(Note, the vertical axis is not to the same for particular products. Thus we see substantial volumes of downward
pricemoves on branded products, not necessarily ﬁtting closely to Edge-
worth cycles, followed defensively by the other player, presumably in
order that their supermarket is not judged by consumers as being
relatively expensive.
Our aim has been to analyse leadership behaviour in the industry
using a framework where we test for signiﬁcance against random
alternatives and linking it to established positive models of the
phenomenon. Whilst we have limited evidence in one category of
goods (Bread and Cereals) that products led upwards increase more
in price than others not led, this is far from a conclusion that price
leadership is a major driver of rapid price increases, particularly
given the extent to which downward price leadership is observed.Appendix A. Sensitivity to the two-week window for regular prices
We chose our time period, within which one of the players must follow the other in a move to a different price level to count as a leadership
event, as two weeks. However, although informed to some extent by industry practice, this is necessarily a little arbitrary. Hence we explored
the sensitivity to the period being alternatively one week or three weeks. The broad results are set out graphically below and more detailed
results are available in the online appendix. Observe that in most cases there is only a marginal gain, in terms of numbers of cases where
Asda or Tesco leadership is seen in the data in each year, from increasing the time to three weeks; there is also of course potentially more
“noise” introduced given the longer period. In most cases signiﬁcantly more events are captured using a two-week rather than a one-week
window, indicating perhaps that one week would be too short to capture the effects. What is reassuring is that the basic pattern of leadership
events is very similar in structure across the three potential time periods and this is conﬁrmed in formal tests reported in Section 7 above.
Therefore we retain the two week window for our analysis.One week Two weeks
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terns given different times to respond
scale across the four figures).
Table A1
Distribution of the sample of products across product categories.
COICOP classiﬁcation Products (additional description) Product numbers
01.1.1 Bread and cereals (including breakfast cereals) 71
01.1.4 Milk, cheese and eggs (including simple manufactures e.g. cream) 40
01.1.5 Oils and fats (olive oil, margarine, butter etc.) 20
01.1.7 Vegetables (mainly canned goods such as beans) 24
01.1.8 Sugar, jam, chocolate, confectionery etc. 32
01.1.9 Food products n.e.c. (sauces, ready-prepared food, condiments) 58
01.2.1 Coffee, tea and cocoa 9
01.2.2 Mineral water, soft drinks, fruit and vegetable juices 2
02.1.1 Spirits (whisky, gin, etc.) 11
02.1.3 Beer (canned and bottled) 9
05.6.1 Non-durable household goods (detergents etc.) 25
09.3.4/5 Products for pets (pet food etc.) 16
12.1.2/3 Articles and products for personal care (e.g. tissues, toothpaste) 14
TOTAL 331
Note: These products are listed by COICOP category. This is Classiﬁcation of individual consumption by purpose, developed by the United Nations Statistics Division to classify and
analyse individual consumption spending.
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Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.07.002.References
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